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Abstract. We present a new strategic logic nchatl that allows for rea-
soning about norm compliance on concurrent game structures that sat-
isfy anonymity. We represent such game structures compactly, avoiding
models that have exponential size in the number of agents. Then we show
that model checking can be done in polynomial time with respect to this
compact representation, even for normative systems that are not anony-
mous. That is, as long as the underlying game structures are anonymous,
model checking normative formulas is tractable even if norms can pre-
scribe different sets of forbidden actions to different agents.
1 Introduction
Logics of strategic ability such as Alternating-time Temporal Logic (atl) [4]
or Coalition Logic [13] have gained much interest in the multi-agent systems
community in recent years. The language of atl (of which Coalition Logic is
the next-time fragment) allows for expressing formulas about strategic ability
of (coalitions of) agents, and it has been used for modelling open multi-agent
systems [3]. Originally, atl was used for modelling heterogeneous systems. Re-
cently, however, a semantics for atl tailored towards systems exhibiting some
degree of homogeneity was presented [15,14].
In this paper, we continue this line of research, noting that the homogeneity
requirement relied on in [15] has been studied independently in game theory,
where anonymity is the name given to a corresponding property of a normal
form game, which is obtained when payoff functions remain invariant under
permutations of players, see e.g., [5,12,6].
We tackle the question of regaining some of the expressive power lost by
requiring anonymity, and we do so by using normative systems. These have
emerged as a promising and powerful framework for coordinating multi-agent
systems [16,17,10,1,8,2]. They allow the modeller to constrain the behaviour of
agents, and can thus provide a way to ensure that the global behaviour of the
system exhibits some desirable properties. We point out that normative systems
? Piotr Kaz´mierczak’s research was supported by the Research Council of Norway
project 194521 (FORMGRID).
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the way we understand them are sometimes also called social laws, and are
simply behavioural restrictions on agents developed by an offline designer (who
is not part of the model), much in the spirit of Shoham & Tenneholtz’s seminal
paper [17], and thus different from normative systems known from deontic logic
literature, since we abstract away from things like obligations, institutions, etc.
A key issue is the question of compliance. Even if a normative system is
effective in the sense that it will ensure that the objective holds, under the
assumption that all agents comply with it, interesting questions and increased
expressive power arise when one assumes that only some agents comply. Despite
the anonymous settings it is not irrelevant who those agents are, in particular,
and as a consequence, a normative system provides us with a way to regain
expressive power that is lost by imposing anonymity. We also show that doing
so for anonymous game structures is possible while maintaining the compact
representation and the tractable model checking that comes with it.
In short, our contribution in this paper combines the following four differ-
ent themes: strategic logic atl, normative systems, homogeneous structures and
anonymous games. The resulting Norm Compliance Homogeneous Alternating-
time Temporal Logic (nchatl), in particular, arises from adding norms to ho-
mogeneous atl [14] in a way that renders the resulting model checking problem
polynomial in the number of agents.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the formal
background, recalling the definition of concurrent game structures (cgss) and
the definition of anonymity used in game theory and social choice theory. We
also present a special case of the construction used in [15], showing how an
anonymous cgs can be succinctly represented as a concurrent game structure
with roles (an rcgs) where the number of roles is exactly one. We go on to
formulate the notions of norms and norm compliance as they are used in the
multi-agent systems community. Then in Section 3 we define a semantics for
nchatl and investigate model checking for this logic, showing that it is tractable.
We conclude in Section 4.
2 Formal Background
We start by introducing some definitions of the formal framework used in the pa-
per. The logical language we use, Lnchatl, is based on atl [4], extended with one
extra operator that we use to express norm compliance. Formally, the language
is generated by the following bnf:
ϕ ::= > | p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∨ ϕ | 〈〈C〉〉 © ϕ | 〈〈C〉〉ϕ | 〈〈C〉〉ϕUϕ | 〈C〉ϕ
where p is a propositional symbol, and C is a coalition of agents.
The language of nchatl contains three types of modalities:
– ©,  and U are standard temporal operators known from many temporal
logics, and stand for “next state”, “some future state” and “until”, respec-
tively;
– 〈〈C〉〉 is a strategic ability operator, and its intuitive meaning is that the
coalition 〈〈C〉〉©ϕ has a joint strategy for enforcing a formula ϕ in the next
state;
– finally 〈C〉 is the norm compliance operator, which intuitive reading is that
the coalition C has a strategy to achieve ϕ if all its members comply to a
given normative system.
2.1 Anonymity
We now define concurrent game structures known from [4] and used for atl
interpretation, and formalize the anonymity requirement mentioned in the in-
troduction. We then define the compact representation of such structures, which
provides the backbone for the semantics of nchatl.
Definition 1 (Concurrent Game Structure). A cgs is a tuple S = 〈A, Q,Π,
pi,A, δ〉 where:
– A is a non-empty set of players. In this text we assume A = [n] for some
n ∈ N, and we reserve n to mean the number of agents.4
– Q is the non-empty set of states.
– Π is a set of propositional letters and pi : Q→ ℘(Π) maps each state to the
set of propositions true in it.
– A : Q × A → N+ is the number of available actions in a given state. We
also say that for each state q ∈ Q a move vector is a tuple 〈α1, . . . , αk〉 s.t.
1 ≤ αa ≤ Aa(q) for each a ∈ A. D is then a move function which given a
state q ∈ Q outputs a set of move vectors.
– For each q ∈ Q and a move vector 〈α1, . . . , αk〉 ∈ D(q) a transition function
produces a state δ(q, α1, . . . , αk) ∈ Q which is a successor of q when every
agent a ∈ {1, . . . , k} chooses αa.
Inspired by the corresponding notion from game theory [7,5,6], we will say
that a cgs S is anonymous if and only if:
∀q∈Q,i,j∈A,A(q, i) = A(q, j) and
∀q∈Q,i,k∈A, δ(q, . . . , αi, . . . , αk, . . .) = δ(q, . . . , αk, . . . , αi, . . .)
Any anonymous cgs can be represented compactly as an rcgs – a Con-
current Game Structure with Roles [15]. In fact, the class of anonymous cgs’s
corresponds to the class of rcgs’s with a single role, a simplified definition of
which can be given as follows [14].
Definition 2. A 1rcgs is a tuple R = 〈A, Q,Π, pi,A, δ〉 where
– A, Q, Π, and pi are defined as in Definition 1,
– A : Q→ N+ is the number of available actions in a given state.
4 For the sake of brevity, we use the notation [n] to indicate the set of numbers
1 ≤ i ≤ n.
– For every state we have a set of vectors P (q) = {F ∈ [n][Aq ] | ∑i≤Aq Fi = n}.
We will refer to the elements of P (q) as the profiles at q. For every state q
and every such profile F ∈ P (q) we have a successor state δ(q, F ) = q′.
The profiles assign a natural number to each action such that the sum of these
numbers (over all actions) sums up to the number of agents n. The intended
meaning is that the profile describes how many agents perform each action. We
also define partial profiles at q ∈ Q, for all A ⊆ A as follows:
P (q, A) =
 F ∈ [n][Aq ]
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
i≤Aq
Fi = |A|
 .
It is not hard to see that a 1rcgs can be given to provide a succinct rep-
resentation for any cgs which satisfies the anonymity requirement; as the per-
mutations of the action profiles are irrelevant, we only need to record how many
agents performed each action.
2.2 Normative systems
Following [2,10] we define a normative system as a map η : Q × A → 2N+ ,
giving, for each state and agent, the set of actions that are forbidden for that
agent in that state. We require η(q, a) ∈ [Aq] for all q ∈ Q, a ∈ A and that
η is such that, for every state, there is at least some legal action. That is,
∀q ∈ Q, a ∈ A : [Aq(a)] \ η(q, a) 6= ∅.
To account for “disobedience” of certain agents (i.e. those that do not comply
with a normative system), we consider normative systems restricted to specific
coalitions. Such a restriction means that only actions that are controlled by a
given coalition are blacklisted (intuitively, anyone not belonging to that coalition
is free not to comply with the normative system). We use the  symbol to denote
such restrictions, and formally define it below:
(η  C)(q, a) =
{
η(q, a) if a ∈ C
∅ otherwise.
Notice that normative systems are not anonymous. It would certainly also
be possible to consider anonymous norms, i.e. norms that are invariant under
agents’ names and simply forbid actions at states. However, since our main result
is that non-anonymous norms are tractable on anonymous structures, we will not
pay much attention to this special case in this paper. We show however, that
for the example from Section 3.1, moving from anonymous to non-anonymous
norms gives us increased expressive power.
3 Tractable norms for anonymous game structures
The semantic structures we will use in this section are defined as follows, follow-
ing [15].
Definition 3. A normative 1rcgs is a pair H = 〈R, η〉 where:
– R is a 1rcgs, and
– η is a normative system for R.
In addition to the notions introduced for 1rcgss, we also need access to the
partial profiles which the agents in some coalition B can choose, assuming that
agents in some other coalition A comply to η. The straightforward way of defining
such profiles is to go via an explicit representation of compliant action-tuples for
B, defined as follows.
Definition 4. Given a 1rcgs H, a state q in H and two coalitions A,B ⊆ A,
an η  A-compatible B-action at q is a vector ρ : B → N+ such that:
∀b ∈ B : ρ(b) ∈ [Aq] \ (η  A)(q, b).
We let ActηA(q,B) denote the set of all η  A-compatible B-actions at q.
Then B-actions give rise to B-profiles as follows.
Definition 5. If ρ is an η  A-compatible B-action, then the corresponding
η  A-compatible B-profile is a vector sηAB : [Aq]→ N such that:
∀i ∈ [Aq] :
(
sηAB
)
(i) = |{b ∈ B | ρ(b) = i}| .
We gather all η  A-compatible B-profiles for which there is a corresponding
η  A-compatible B-action at q in the set P ηA(q,B).
Notice that a direct computation of this set, using Definition 4, requires
computing the set ActηA(q,B), which can have exponential size in the number
of agents from B. This would defeat the purpose of compact representation, the
aim of which is to ensure that complexity of model checking remains polynomial
in the number of agents as long as the number of actions is constant. It turns
out, however, that computation of ActηA(q,B) can be avoided for arbitrary (non-
anonymous) normative systems, and that a polynomial-time procedure can be
used instead. We return to this challenge in Section 3.2, after we have defined
truth on normative 1rcgs models.
To do this, we need some more notation. Given F ∈ P ηA(q,B), G ∈ P ηC(q,D),
we say that F ≥ G if A = C and for every i ∈ [Aq] we have Fi ≥ Gi. Given two
states q, q′ ∈ Q, we say that q′ is a successor of q if there is some F ∈ P (q) such
that δ(q, F ) = q′. A computation is an infinite sequence λ = q0q1 . . . of states
such that for all positions i ≥ 0, qi+1 is a successor of qi. We follow standard
abbreviations, hence a q-computation denotes a computation starting at q, and
λ[i], λ[0, i] and λ[i,∞] denote the i-th state, the finite prefix q0q1 . . . qi and the
infinite suffix qiqi+1 . . . of λ for any computation λ and its position i ≥ 0, re-
spectively.
Definition 6. An η  A-compatible B-strategy is a map sB : Q→
⋃
q∈Q P
η
A(q,B)
such that:
sB(q) ∈ P ηA(q,B) for each q ∈ Q.
We denote the set of all such strategies by stratηA(B).
Notice that if s ∈ stratηA(A) for some A ⊆ A, then if we apply δ(q) to
s(q) we obtain a unique new state q′ = δ(q, s(q)). Iterating, we get the induced
computation λs,q = q0q1 . . . such that q = q0 and ∀i ≥ 0 : δ(qi, (s(qi))) = qi+1.
Given sB ∈ stratηA(B) and a state q we get an associated set of computations
out(sB , q). This is the set of all computations that can result when at any state,
B is acting in the way specified by sB . That is,
out(sB , q) := {λs,q | s ∈ stratηA(A) and sB ≤ s}. (1)
We can now define normative satisfaction on 1rcgs’s as follows.
Definition 7. Given a normative 1rcgs (H, η), a state q and a coalition A ⊆
A, truth of ϕ on (H, η) under A-compliance is defined inductively.
– H, η,A, q |= p iff q ∈ pi(p)
– H, η,A, q |= ¬ϕ iff H, η,A, q 6|= ϕ
– H, η,A, q |= ϕ ∨ ψ iff H, η,A, q |= ϕ or H, η,A, q |= ψ
– H, η,A, q |= 〈〈C〉〉©ϕ iff ∃sC ∈ stratηA(C) : ∀λ ∈ out(sC , q) : λ[1] |= ϕ
– H, η,A, q |= 〈〈C〉〉ϕ iff ∃sC ∈ stratηA(C) : ∀λ ∈ out(sC , q) :
∀i ≥ 0 : λ[i] |= ϕ
– H, η,A, q |= 〈〈C〉〉ϕUψ iff ∃sC ∈ stratηA(C) : ∀λ ∈ out(sC , q) : ∃i ≥ 0 :
(λ[i] |= ψ ∧ ∀j ∈ [i] : λ[j] |= ϕ)
– H, η,A, q |= 〈B〉ϕ iff H, η,B, q |= ϕ
Clearly, to solve the model checking problem for this logic, we need to com-
pute sets of the form P ηA(q,B), and how to do this efficiently is the main ob-
stacle preventing a quick algorithm. We address and resolve this challenge in
Section 3.2, but first we consider an example.
3.1 Example
For a simple illustration of the kind of reasoning we can perform using norms on
anonymous game structures let us assume we have a system set up to perform
two tasks, p1 and p2. Let us further assume that the system contains agents
A = [n] where, for simplicity, we assume n is a multiple of 10. Also, assume that
every agent must choose to contribute to either p1 or p2, a choice we encode
as a choice between shared actions αp1 and αp2 . If the task p1 is successfully
performed, p1 becomes true in the next state, and similarly for the task p2.
As it happens, our system is such that in order for p1 to be successfully
performed we need 80 − 90% of the agents to contribute towards p1. That is,
for p1 to become true, such a percentage of agents have to choose αp1 as their
action. On the other hand, in order for p2 to be true in the next state, we need
20−60% of the agents to perform αp2 . In Figure 1 we depict an 1rcgs modelling
such a scenario.5
Notice that if both p1 and p2 are to be performed successfully, we need pre-
cisely 20% of the agents to perform αp2 while the remaining 80% choose to do
αp1 . It follows that in order to successfully complete both tasks, we need coor-
dination. In fact, as it stands, we need everyone to coordinate their actions with
everyone else. In terms of atl, since successful completion of both p1 and p2
results from a unique profile, only the grand coalition can ensure p ∧ q. That is,
while we have H, q |= 〈〈A〉〉 © (p ∧ q), we also have H, q |= [[A]]© (¬p ∨ ¬q) for
all A ⊂ A.6
Moreover, notice that even if some coalition A ⊆ A can observe what the
agents in A \A do, they might not necessarily respond in such a way that p ∧ q
becomes true. To see this, assume that A contains 60% of the agents. Then if
the remaining agents all perform αp2 , it becomes impossible for A to respond in
such a way that p1 becomes true. We have, in particular, 〈〈A \A〉〉 © ¬p.
q
∅
q0,100
∅
q10,90
{p1}
q20,80
{p1,p2}
. . . q60,40{p2}
. . . q100,0∅
〈0,100〉 〈20,80〉 〈60,40〉 〈100,0〉
∅ p1 p2 ∅
Fig. 1. A coordination problem resolved by norms
Suppose that we want to use norms to achieve p∧q even under the assumption
that only those agents that are in A are capable of coordinating their actions.
Clearly, this is possible. For instance, if we simply demand that A\A all perform
the same action, and they comply, then, assuming the norm to be common
knowledge, A can adapt accordingly. Somewhat more subtly, notice that in order
to ensure [[A\A]]©(p∧q) we do not require such a powerful norm. It is sufficient,
5 The pairs used to decorate transitions denote profiles, with the first coordinate being
the percentage of agents doing αp1 , and the second coordinate being those who do
αp2 . We have δ(q0, 〈i, j〉) = qi,j for all such tuples. We omit reflexive loops for all
states qi,j .
6 [[]] is the dual of the strategic ability operator 〈〈〉〉. Intuitively, [[A]]ϕ means that
coalition A can not avoid ϕ.
in particular, to fix some B ⊆ A\A containing 20% of the agents, and introduce
the norm η defined by:
η(q, a) =
{
{αp2} if q = q0, a ∈ B
∅ otherwise.
As long as B complies, A can indeed achieve p∧ q as long as they observe what
the other agents do and adapt accordingly. In logical terms, we have H, η, ∅, q0 |=
〈B〉[[A\A]]© (p∧ q). If it is not obvious, we leave it to the reader to verify this,
possibly by using mcheck from Algorithm 1.
The toy example considered here also serves to illustrate that non-anonymous
norms give increased expressive power compared to norms that just forbid a
set of actions. Consider, in particular, the situation when we want to empower
A to choose whether p1 or p2 is to become true, irrespectively of what the
remaining agents do. Using a non-anonymous norm, this can be achieved by
choosing B′ ∈ A containing 10% of the agents such that B′ ∩ A = B′ ∩ B = ∅.
To see this, consider the norm η′ defined by:
η′(q, a) =

{αp2} if q = q0, a ∈ B
{αp1} if q = q0, a ∈ B′
∅ otherwise.
Then, as long as B ∪B′ comply, we have at least 10% doing αp2 and 20% doing
αp1 , from which it follows that p1 is ensured as long as all members of A perform
αp1 , while p2 is ensured, for instance, if 50% of the members in A perform αp2 .
We have, in particular, H, η′, ∅, q |= 〈B ∪ B′〉(〈〈A〉〉 © p ∧ 〈〈A〉〉 © q). It is not
hard to see that no anonymous norm can achieve this, as long as only 30% of
the agents are assumed to comply with it.
3.2 Characterizing η  A-compatible B-profiles
In this section, we will provide a characterization showing that quick computa-
tion of the sets P ηA(q,B) is indeed possible. Towards this result, we first observe
the following simple fact, the proof of which is trivial and omitted.
Whenever we use the “+” symbol with respect to vectors, we mean addition
coordinate-wise.
Proposition 1. Given a 1rcgs, a normative system η, coalitions A,B ⊆ A
and a state q ∈ Q, we have F ∈ P ηA(q,B) if, and only if,
∃F1 ∈ P (q,B \A), ∃F2 ∈ P ηA(q, A ∩B) s.t. F = F1 + F2.
We will also need the following auxiliary function.
Definition 8. Given an 1rcgs H, a normative system η and any state q ∈ Q
we define, for all E ⊆ Aq, A ⊆ A, the following set:
Cqη(E,A) = |{x ∈ A | η(q, x) ∩ E 6= ∅}|.
So Cqη(E,A) returns the number of agents in A that have a legal action in E at
q. Using this function allows us to characterize P ηA(q,B) more compactly using a
matching argument, giving rise to the following lemma, towards tractable model
checking.
Lemma 1. For any 1rcgs, any normative system η and any A,B ⊆ A we
have F ∈ P ηA(q,B) iff F = F1 + F2 for some F1 ∈ P (q,B \ A) and some
F2 ∈ P (q, A ∩B) such that:
∀E ⊆ [Aq] : Cqη(E,A ∩B) ≥
∑
i∈E
F2(i). (2)
Proof. ⇒) Trivial.
⇐) Assume that we have F = F1+F2 for F1 ∈ P (q,B \A) and F2 ∈ P (q, A∩B)
such that (2) holds. We demonstrate existence of ρ ∈ ActηA(q,B) that induces
the profile F2, i.e., such that
F2(i) = |{x ∈ A ∩B | ρ(x) = i}| for all i ∈ [Aq].
We will think of ρ as the solution of a matching problem in a bipartite graph: Let
G = (V1, V2, E) where V1 = A∩B, V2 = {ij | i ∈ [Aq], j ∈ [F2(i)]} are the two sets
of nodes and E = {(x, ij) | i 6∈ η(q, x)} is the set of edges. Notice that |V1| = |V2|
since F2 ∈ P (q, A∩B), and that the graph is indeed bipartite. For all subsets of
V ⊆ V2, let V − = {x ∈ V1 | ∃ij ∈ V2 : (x, ij) ∈ E}. Then, since F2 satisfies (2), it
follows that for all V ⊆ V2 we have |V −| ≥ V . This means that the conditions of
Hall’s marriage theorem are all fulfilled (well known from graph theory, originally
published in [9]), meaning that there exists a set E′ ⊆ E such that for every
ij ∈ V2 there is a unique x ∈ V1 such that (x, ij) ∈ E′, i.e., such that E′ is a
matching in G. Let us define the vector ρ : A ∩ B → N+ such that ρ(x) = i for
all (x, ij) ∈ E′. Clearly, since E′ is a matching, this is well-defined and we have
ρ ∈ ActηA(q,B) as desired. Moreover, it is easy to see that ρ corresponds to F2
in the sense of Definition 5. We conclude that F2 ∈ P ηA(q,B ∩ A). Then, from
Proposition 1 it follows that F = F1 + F2 ∈ P ηA(q,B), concluding the proof. uunionsq
In Figure 2 we illustrate how P ηA(q,B) is generated, by calculating the sets
P (q,B \A) and P (q,B∩A) the latter of which is then restricted to the elements
which satisfy Condition (2) (in Lemma 1). The parameters of the situation illus-
trated is the number of actions Aq = 3 and the set of agents A = {a, b, c, d, e}
with agents A = {b, c, d} complying to η, and the agents for which we are mak-
ing a set of profiles for are contained in B = {c, d, e}. The consequence of η for
the two agents in B which do comply, is that it forbids action 2 for agent c and
actions 1 and 2 for agent d.
In light of Lemma 1, it is clearly possible, as long as the number of actions
is constant, to generate P ηA(q,B) in polynomial time for all A,B, q. We simply
run through all F ∈ P (q, A∩B) and check if Condition (2) holds. This involves
running though all subsets of Aq, but still it only requires a constant number of
traversals of A ∩B. Then the set P ηA(q,B) is obtained from any such F passing
〈2,0,0〉,
〈1,1,0〉,
〈0,1,1〉,
〈0,2,0〉
〈1,0,1〉,
〈0,0,2〉
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η(q, c)
η(q, d)
ActηA(q,B)
P ηA(q,B)P
η
A(q,B ∩A)
P (q,B \A)P (q,B ∩A)
〈1,0,0〉,
〈0,1,0〉,
〈0,0,1〉
〈2,0,1〉, 〈1,0,2〉,
〈1,1,1〉, 〈0,1,2〉,
〈1,0,2〉, 〈0,0,3〉
Fig. 2. Illustration of Lemma 1.
the test, when added to any vector from the set P (q,B \ A), as detailed in
Algorithm 3.
We mention that the construction in the proof of Lemma 1 mirrors the con-
struction used in [6] to establish that finding pure Nash equilibria in an anony-
mous normal form game is decidable in polynomial time provided the number
of actions remain constant. This result, in particular, is also obtained by an
application of Hall’s marriage theorem.
More importantly, given an 1rcgs H, a normative system η, a state q ∈ Q
and coalitions A,B, it seems clear that we can define an anonymous normal
form game such that P ηA(q,B) is the set of pure Nash equilibria in this game.
We omit the details due to space restrictions, but remark that as Lemma 1 can
be seen as a corollary of results from [6], it follows that computing P ηA(q,B) can
also be done by employing the more subtle techniques introduced there, used to
prove membership in the complexity class TC0. This means, in particular, that
the algorithm presented in the next section, while showing that model checking
is tractable, could be improved on this point. Here, however, we do not focus on
the design of optimal procedures, but on clearly conveying the main result and
the ideas that have precipitated it.
3.3 Tractable model checking
The algorithm for checking truth of ϕ in a normative 1rcgs follows exactly
the same pattern as the standard model checking algorithm used to do model
checking on cgs models, see e.g., [11]. Given a cgs model S and a formula ϕ,
this algorithm processes ϕ recursively and returns the set of states q ∈ Q where
ϕ is true. To deal correctly with 〈〈A〉〉ϕ and 〈〈A〉〉ϕUψ the algorithm relies on
the following fixed point characterizations, which are well-known to hold for atl,
see for instance [11], and are also easily seen to be true on any normative 1rcgs
model, c.f., Definition 7:
〈〈A〉〉ϕ↔ ϕ ∧ 〈〈A〉〉 © 〈〈A〉〉ϕ
〈〈A〉〉ϕ1Uϕ2 ↔ ϕ2 ∨ (ϕ1 ∧ 〈〈A〉〉 © 〈〈A〉〉ϕ1Uϕ2
(3)
In light of this, the correctness of the algorithm mcheck, shown in Algo-
rithm 1, follows trivially if we can establish correctness of the algorithm enforce,
shown in Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 1 mcheck(H, η,A, ϕ) algorithm
if ϕ = p ∈ Π then
return pi(p)
if ϕ = ¬ψ then
return Q \ mcheck(H, η,A, ψ)
if ϕ = ψ ∨ ψ′ then
return mcheck(H, η,A, ψ) ∪ mcheck(H, η,A, ψ′)
if ϕ = 〈〈B〉〉 © ψ then
return {q | enforce(H, η,A, q,B, mcheck(H, η,A, ψ))}
if ϕ = 〈〈B〉〉ψ then
Q1 := Q
Q2 := mcheck(H, η,A, ψ)
while Q1 6⊆ Q2 do
Q1 := Q2
Q2 := {q ∈ Q | enforce(H, η,A,B, q,Q2)} ∩Q2
return Q1
if ϕ = 〈〈B〉〉ψUψ′ then
Q1 := ∅
Q2 = mcheck(H,ψ)
Q3 = mcheck(H,ψ
′)
while Q3 6⊆ Q1 do
Q1 := Q1 ∪Q3
Q3 := {q ∈ Q | enforce(H, η,A,B, q,Q1)} ∩Q2
return Q3
if ϕ = 〈A′〉ψ then
return mcheck(H, η,A′, ψ)
This algorithm answers, given a normative 1rcgs (H, η), a state q, coali-
tions A,B ⊆ A and a set of states Q′, whether or not there is some strategy
sB ∈ stratηA(B) such that {λ[1] ∈ Q | λ ∈ out(sB , q)} ⊆ Q′. Clearly, such
a strategy exists if, and only if, there is some FB ∈ P ηA(q,B) such that for all
F ∈ P ηA(q,A), if FA ≤ F then δ(q, F ) ∈ Q′. Thus, correctness of enforce follows
if the algorithm comp, shown in Algorithm 3, correctly computes the necessary
Algorithm 2 enforce(H, η,Aq,B,Q′) algorithm
Spro = comp(η,A, q, B) // Spro = P
η
A(q,B)
Sant = comp(η,A, q, B) // Sant = P
η
A(q, (A \B))
for FB ∈ Spro do
x = true
for FB′ ∈ Sant do
if δq(FB + FB′) /∈ Q′ then
x = false
if x = true then
return true
return false
sets P ηA(q,B). This, in turn, clearly follows from Lemma 1. To see this, notice
that the step when we place agents in the set T corresponds exactly to the
calculation of Cqη(E,A).7
Moreover, notice that all of the procedures involved in model checking have
polynomial complexity in the length of the formula and the size of the model.
This follows by the fact that the sizes of Spro and Sant, used by enforce and cal-
culated by comp, have sizes bounded above by
(|B|+(|Aq|−1))!
|B|!(|Aq|−1)! and
(|A\B|+(|Aq|−1))!
|A\B|!(|Aq|−1)!
respectively. These combinatorial expressions are both bounded above by |A||Aq|,
so there is indeed no exponential dependence on the number of agents, only on
the number of actions. Also remember that we compute Spro and Sant effectively,
by applying Lemma 1. The main result follows.
Theorem 1. Given a normative 1rcgs (H, η), a state q ∈ Q, a coalition A ⊆ A
and a formula ϕ: Deciding if H, η,A, q |= ϕ takes polynomial time in the size of
H and the length of ϕ.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we have considered concurrent game structures that satisfy anonymity.
Following [15,14], we represent these structures compactly, avoiding models that
have exponential size in the number of agents. Then we consider normative sys-
tems applied to such models, resulting in the logic nchatl. Our main technical
result is that this logic still admits a tractable algorithm for the model checking
problem.
More generally, we believe our work serves to establish interesting connec-
tions, both conceptual and technical, between recent work in algorithmic game
theory and recent work on logics for strategic ability of coalitions of agents. It
seems, in particular, that a major challenge which is becoming increasingly im-
portant to both these fields is the need for compact representations, allowing us
7 This implementation of the P ηA(q,B), collecting agents in T , could be optimized if
we just count the first occurrence of a satisfying condition (where a is added to T )
and move on to the next agent. We use a set to simplify the presentation.
Algorithm 3 comp(η,A, q,B) algorithm including T = Cqη(E,A)
R = P (q,B \A)
for x ∈ P (q,B ∩A) do
y = true
for E ⊆ Aq do
T = ∅
for a ∈ B ∩A do
for α ∈ E do
if α /∈ η(q, a) then
add a to T
if |T | <∑α∈E xα then
y = false
if y = true then
add x to R
return R
to make use of established formalisms to analyse systems with a large number
of participating agents.
In order for this to become feasible in practice, we certainly require represen-
tations and notions that avoid introducing exponential time-dependence on the
number of agents that are present. The danger, however, is that when formulat-
ing restrictions that make this possible, one deprives the underlying formalism
of crucial expressive power. In this paper, we have addressed this worry for atl,
and shown that norms can be used to regain some of what is lost by requiring
anonymity.
Moreover, and somewhat surprisingly, it turns out that even non-homogeneous
norms can be implemented without introducing any exponential dependence on
the agents. We conclude, therefore, that normative systems are a good candidate
in general for giving compact multi-agent formalism a limited, but useful, means
for talking about such heterogeneous properties that can be expressed without
resulting in an exponential blow-up of crucial decision problems.
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